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Abstract—Database audit records are important for investi-
gating suspicious actions against transactional databases. Their
admissibility as digital evidence depends on satisfying Chain of
Custody (CoC) properties during their generation, collection and
preservation in order to prevent their modification, guarantee
action accountability, and allow third-party verification. However,
their production has relied on auditing capabilities provided by
commercial database systems which may not be effective if ma-
licious users (or insiders) misuse their privileges to disable audit
controls, and compromise their admissibility. Hence, in this paper,
we propose a forensically-aware distributed database architecture
that implements CoC properties as functional requirements to
produce admissible audit records. The novelty of our proposal is
the use of hybrid logical clocks, which compared with a previous
centralised vector-clock architecture, has evident advantages as
it (i) allows for more accurate provenance and causality tracking
of insider actions, (ii) is more scalable in terms of system size,
and (iii) although latency is higher (as expected in distributed
environments), 70 per cent of user transactions are executed
within acceptable latency intervals.
Index Terms—database audit, database forensics, database
security, hybrid logical clocks, chain of custody, provenance,
causality, role segregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, research about the efficient design of computing
architectures for processing secure database transactions was
already proposed as part of OS kernel extensions [1]. Currently,
user applications and software development needs, have evolved
these controls from obscure kernel primitives to user-accessible
audit functionality in commercial transactional databases [2][3]
in order to secure distributed transaction processing. Conversely,
when security of such transactions is compromised, database
forensics has emerged as a reactive approach to investigate
(obtain, analyse and present in court) digital evidence about
the attribution of actions to malicious users [4], which may
not be fully compatible when dealing with complex database
structures [5]. Instead, a proactive approach for the generation,
collection and preservation of database audit records seems
more suitable for capturing the occurrence of DML operations
(events) during the normal operation of a forensically-aware
database architecture [6]. Particularly, for making these au-
dit records forensically admissible as digital evidence, this
approach enforces Chain of Custody (CoC) properties [8]
as (1) role segregation to prevent their modification, (2)
capturing provenance of every event performed on transactional
data, (3) event ordering in a timeline for explaining their
causality and allowing third-party verification, and (4) ensuring
these properties remain active during the architecture’s normal
operation. However, if malicious users (insiders) misuse their
privileges [7] in order to disable any audit functionality
and compromise a transactional database, CoC properties are
affected, making any audit records inadmissible as evidence.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose, deploy and evaluate a
forensically-aware distributed database architecture designed to
handle suspicious DML operations when insiders misuse their
credentials to alter a database state without being detected. This
novel architecture is based on hybrid logical clocks (HLC), first
proposed in [9], but implementing CoC properties at its core
to support the generation, collection and preservation of audit
records, having a transactional and a forensic database residing
on separate servers. As opposed to a previous centralised vector-
clock (VC) based architecture [6], an experimental deployment
of our proposal shows that (i) provenance and causality tracking
is indeed more accurate, preventing inconsistent observations
since concurrent and sequential events are timelined using
synchronised physical clocks (ii) timestamps are node and audit
table independent, making it more scalable in terms of system
size and (iii) although higher latency is expected due to its
distributed deployment, around 70 per cent of user transactions
will incur within acceptable latency intervals. The rest of the
article is outlined as follows. In Section II, research background
and related work is provided, followed by an explanation of
both system and attack models in Section III. Next, in Section
IV, we explain the architecture’s formal specification, having
role segregation, provenance, timelining and causality as CoC
properties [6]. Then, in sections V and VI, we deploy and
evaluate the architecture performance. Finally, conclusions
about our current and future work are given in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The malicious insider threat against information [10][11][12]
stored in databases urges the development of alternative solu-
tions with auditing capabilities within distributed architectures
even in the presence of an insider adversary. Although, such
architectures have been already proposed [1][13][14][15][16],
none of them considered Chain of Custody (CoC) properties and
their implication in the admissibility of audit records as digital
evidence. Our current research is focused on the design and
deployment of such an architecture, based on previous work de-
veloped in [6], where a vector-clock (VC) mechanism[17] was
used for tracking DML operations’ provenance and causality,
producing audit records within a forensically-ready database
architecture. Nonetheless, beyond the evident scalability issue
between the VC timestamp size and the number of audit
tables, this mechanism also introduced precision issues and
uncertain causal observations [18] because these are designed
to enable operation ordering rather than, in fact, determining
the actual physical time of their occurrence. Conversely, recent
work in the field of multi-version databases such as Google’s
Spanner [19], Cockroach DB [9] and Yesquel [20] has inspired
our current work with the introduction of a Hybrid-Logical-
Clock (HLC) mechanism which extends the functionality
of vector clocks by using synchronised system clocks for
calculating accurate timestamps of audit records. As a result,
both the scalability and uncertainty problem of VC can be
solved since our HLC-based proposal employs more accurate
timestamp calculations to build a timeline for analysing the
causality of audit records during their generation, collection
and preservation.
III. MODELS
We now present the models assumed in this work.
A. System Model
Our proposed architecture comprises a transactional (NDB)
and a forensic (FDB) database for the generation, collection
and preservation of admissible audit records. We assume
NDB and FDB to be sets of database tables and audit tables,
respectively, being each NDB horizontally fragmented so that
the architecture can scale to include more than one node (a pair
〈NDB,FDB〉) if required. Each database table Ti ∈ NDB has a
corresponding audit table Fi ∈ FDB. The execution of the jth
DML operation (insert, update or delete) in a table Ti ∈ NDB
initiates the generation, collection and preservation of an audit
record eji in the corresponding audit table Fi ∈ FDB. For
maintaining consistency and atomicity in databases, not only
for audit records, but also the resulting timeline, conservative
2-phase locking [21] is implemented as a single transactional
block from the generation of DML operations at NDB to
the collection and preservation of audit records at FDB. We
also assume that each node have forensic controllers for the
accurate timestamping and sequencing of the records.
B. Attack Model
An insider adversary model is considered [10][22], assuming
insiders misusing their access credentials to NDB. Insiders
interact with NDB using low-privilege (DBusr), or high-
privilege (DBadm) roles. The first is for data entry purposes
only whilst the second is a high-privilege role for managing
NDB and its stored data. We assume that an insider can
use the assigned DBadm role to access NDB, and execute
DML operations to modify or impersonate other insiders with
low privilege access (DBusr). Insiders can execute DML
operations against any database table in NDB, the actions
of which can be monitored by a forensic role (DBfor)
exclusively reserved for accessing audit records and their
timeline in FDB. As insiders are not trusted, we require
that DBadm 6= DBfor to prevent insiders from conveniently
disabling forensic functionality. We also assume no collusion
between a DBadm and a DBfor.
IV. FORMALISING THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
To detect malicious insider actions within our proposed
architecture, Chain-of-Custody (CoC) must be enforced, requir-
ing the following important properties as defined in [6]: (i)
role segregation, (ii) DML operation provenance, (iii) event
timelining and (iv) causality. As a result, audit records can be
used as digital evidence to attribute malicious insider actions
against a transactional database NDB.
A. Role Segregation:
In the next definitions, a clear separation of duties is
established, abstracting the forensic functionality to NDB users
whilst preventing FDB users to interfere with the normal
operations of NDB.
Definition IV.1. Transactional Database: A transactional
database NDB is a set of tables T1 . . . Tm:
NDB = {Ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} (1)
Definition IV.2. Forensic Database: A forensic database FDB
is a set of audit tables F1 . . .Fm:
FDB = {Fi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} (2)
Definition IV.3. Database Table: A database table Ti is a
sequence of entries dki , representing the k
th entry in table Ti:
Ti =
[
dki | 1 ≤ k
]
(3)
Definition IV.4. Audit Table: An audit table is a sequence
of audit records eji , representing the j




eji | 1 ≤ j
]
(4)
Then, a function corr maps the current state of a database table
Ti ∈ NDB with their corresponding audit table Fi ∈ FDB:
corr : NDB → FDB
corr(T ′i ) = Fi
(5)
Definition IV.5. Database Roles: Let R be a 3-element set
denoting database roles such that:
R = {DBusr,DBadm,DBfor} (6)
Both roles DBusr and DBadm enable insiders to interact with
NDB to perform regular operations (data entry) or adminis-
trative functions (data management), respectively. Meanwhile,
DBfor is a role exclusively assigned to forensic users who can
access FDB to monitor suspicious insider actions if required.
Definition IV.6. Insider: Let I be a set of insiders who can
interact with NDB, and perform DML operations in a table
Ti ∈ NDB. Then, a surjective function assgTo maps an insider
(a) Audit records eji in a VC timeline Tι. At time pt = 11
an inconsistent (dashed) cut could also be obtained, wrongfully
suggesting that e13 could have happened at pt = 10.
(b) Audit records eji in a HLC timeline Tι. This mechanism solves
VC inconsistency using a concurrency flag. E.g. 2 and 3 audit records
have been certainly observed at pt = 10 and pt = 11, respectively
Fig. 1: Construction of a timeline Tι using Vector-Clocks (VC) and Hybrid-Logical-Clocks (HLC)
u to only one database role r, preventing, for example, having
forensic and administrative roles assigned to the same insider.
assgTo : I  R
∀u ∈ I • ∃r ∈ R • r = assgTo(u) (7)
B. DML Operation Provenance
For accountability purposes, the following definitions allow
capturing provenance information about interactions between
insiders u and NDB.
Definition IV.7. DML Operations: Let O be a 3-element set
of DML operations such that:
O = {I,D,U}, insert (I), delete (D), update (U) (8)
Definition IV.8. Provenance: Let provenance P be a set of
5-attribute tuples ρki , capturing the UTC timestamp Ts, insider
u, role r and origin o of a DML operation op in the kth entry
of table Ti:
P = {ρki | 1 ≤ mi ≤ i, 1 ≤ ni ≤ k}
ρki = 〈Ts, op, u, r, o〉, where Ts ∈ Z,op ∈ O, u ∈ I, r ∈ R,
o ∈ Z× Z× Z× Z
(9)
Here, provenance is tuple-size independent, allowing for
more/less contextual information if required.
C. Audit Record Timelining
A timeline Tι is an accurate chronological record for
explaining the occurrence of DML operations in a table
Ti ∈ NDB, and preserving the occurrence of their correspond-
ing audit records, generated and collected in an audit table
Fi ∈ FDB. Our current proposal uses a Hybrid-Logical-Clock
(HLC) mechanism, an approach similar to the Vector-Clock
(VC) counterpart proposed in [6]. Whilst both approaches
timeline and analyse the causality of audit records during
their generation, collection and preservation, VC is not very
efficient in distributed architectures due to both the lack of
scalability and uncertain concurrent observations[9]. Firstly,
VC cannot support an increasing number of audit tables without
augmenting it timestamp size. Meanwhile, HLC is independent
of the number of audit tables, making it more scalable to
support more nodes 〈NDB,FDB〉 if required which makes
it ideal for distributed fragmented or replicated databases.
Secondly, although VC timestamps are efficient for tracking
causality, they are not aware of physical time. Thus, as shown
in Fig.1a, VC may not identify consistent cuts at physical time
pt, resulting in inaccurate observations of concurrent audit
records. Whereas in Fig.1b, HLC solves this problem with
a concurrency flag to monitor concurrent events on every
observable time interval. In the following definitions, we
explain the functional requirements to build a HLC-based
timeline Tι, assuming both NDB and FDB synchronised using
a reliable time protocol such as NTP (Network Time Protocol)
for accurate physical time reading.
Definition IV.9. Audit Record: When a DML operation O in
a table Ti ∈ NDB occurs, an audit record is created. Hence,
an audit record eji is a 3-tuple that captures the table state
change from Ti to T ′i with timestamp τ :
eji = 〈τ, δ, ρki 〉, where τ ∈ Z× Z× N,
δ : tuple 〈dki , dki ′〉, ρki ∈ P (10)
Notice that e.τ 6= e.ρ[Ts] in Eq. (10). Whilst the former
captures the UNIX Epoch time as part of a HLC timestamp
when changing table state, the latter captures the UTC
timestamp Ts as a provenance attribute of e when a DML
operation e.ρ[o] causes that state shift. Further details about
the calculation of e.τ and e.ρ[Ts] are explained in Sections
V-C2 and V-C3.
Definition IV.10. Evidence Generation: A function gen maps a
kth entry on table Ti with the corresponding DML operation
that changed the state of such table to T ′i :
gen : N+ ×NDB → O×NDB
gen(k, Ti) =

a) (I, T ′i ), if T
′




b) (U, T ′i ), if T
′




c) (D,T ′i ), if T
′
i = {k} −C Ti
(11)
a) During an insertion, an entry d is appended to a table T .
b) In case of an update, an entry d in table T is overwritten.
c) If an entry d is deleted, it is removed from table T .
Definition IV.11. Evidence Collection: Following Eq.(5) and
Eq. (11), in Eq.(12), a function colct maps a DML operation
on the kth entry of table Ti with the jth audit record in its
corresponding audit table Fi, recording the table change from
Ti to T ′i :
colct : O ×NDB → O×FDB
colct(gen(k, Ti)) =

a) (I, corr(T ′i )), if F ′i = Fi _ [eji ]∧
eji = 〈τ,⊥, dki , ρki 〉
b) (U, corr(T ′i )), if F ′i = Fi _ [eji ]∧
eji = 〈τ, dki , dki ′, ρki 〉
c) (D, corr(T ′i )), if F ′i = Fi _ [eji ]∧
eji = 〈τ, dki ,⊥, ρki 〉
(12)
a) If an entry d is inserted, an audit record e is appended to
an audit table F , and e.δ = 〈⊥, dnew〉.
b) If there is an update, an audit record e is appended to an
audit table F , and e.δ = 〈dold, dnew〉.
c) In case an entry d is deleted, an audit record e is appended
to an audit table F , and e.δ = 〈dold,⊥〉.
Definition IV.12. Evidence Preservation: A causal table Tι ∈
FDB is a timeline comprising a sequence of timestamps Vm,
such that:
Tι = [Vm | 1 ≤ m ≤ n] (13)
A timestamp Vm is a 4-tuple, such that:
Vm = 〈i, j, τm, Tms 〉, where τm ∈ Z× Z×N, Tms ∈ Z (14)
A timestamp Vm captures the generation and collection of the
jth audit record in the ith audit table with HLC timestamp
τm and UTC timestamp Tms .
Notice that e.τ in Eq.(12) < e.τm in Eq.(14) so that the
observed timestamp τm of the audit record eji in Tι is always
greater than the registered timestamp τ in its audit table Fi.
Lastly, from Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), in Eq.(15) a function prsv
appends the timestamp Vm to the timeline Tι if an entry d is
in the tuple e.δ as either a dold or dnew entry.
prsv : O ×FDB → FDB
prsv(colct(gen(k, Ti))) = Tι _ [〈i, j, τ l, T ls〉]
⇐⇒ ∃!δ ∈ eji .δ • δ 6= 〈∅〉
(15)
Notice that by means of composite functions colct and prsv
we are enforcing conservative 2-phase locking during the
generation, collection and preservation of audit records. This
simply means that audit records cannot be preserved if their
generation and collection are not executed in that order.
D. Event Causality
As mentioned before, using HLC to build a timeline
offers evident advantages for designing an efficient distributed
forensically-aware database architecture. We develop our
current work based on the causality definitions and HLC imple-
mentation given in [9]. Unlike the VC causality definitions in
[6], their counterparts featured in our current work strengthen
their HLC timestamp conditions because these cannot increase
unboundedly, ending up recording audit records ahead of the
timeline’s physical time. Now, once audit records have been
timelined, the index j used to trace their ordering within an
audit table Fi can be omitted so that audit records can be
referred as ei being identifiable only by their HLC timestamp
and the index of the audit table Fi to which they belong.
Definition IV.13. Forensic Evidence Set: Audit records in
Tι ∈ FDB are elements of an forensic evidence set E:
E = {ei | i ∈ N+} (16)
Causality in these audit records dictate that they are either
sequential or concurrent, justifying their relationship by means
of a “happen-before” relation ( hb−→). So when using hybrid
logical clocks (HLC), from Eq. (10), ei.τ is 3-tuple recording
the following time information [9]:
• ei.τ [pt]: the instant physical time of a DML operation
observed and recorded in an audit record ei.
• ei.τ [l]: the maximum physical time known about the
occurrence of a DML operation in the corresponding
audit record ei.
• ei.τ [c]: a flag to indicate that an audit record ei has
recorded a DML operation which is concurrent with an-
other.
Definition IV.14. Event Sequentiality Property: Let ea, eb ∈ E
be two audit records collected in audit tables Fa and Fb,
recording the DML operations generated in their correspond-
ing database tables Ta and Tb. Then, ea is sequential with eb
if (ea.τ [l], ea.τ [c]) < (eb.τ [l], eb.τ [c]):
∀ea, eb ∈ E • (ea hb−→ eb ⇒ (ea.τ [l], ea.τ [c]) <
(eb.τ [l], eb.τ [c]) ⇐⇒ (ea.τ [l] < eb.τ [l]) ∨ ((ea.τ [l]
= eb.τ [l]) ∧ (ea.τ [c] < eb.τ [c]))) (17)
Definition IV.15. Event Transitivity Property: Having three
audit records ea, eb, ec ∈ E , if ea hb−→ eb and eb hb−→ ec; then,
ea
hb−→ ec:
∀ea, eb, ec ∈ E • (ea hb−→ eb ∧ eb hb−→ ec ⇒ ea hb−→ ec∧
(ea.τ [l], ea.τ [c]) < (ec.τ [l], ec.τ [c])) (18)
Which follows from Eq.(17) for demonstrating that ea
hb−→ ec.
Definition IV.16. Event Concurrency Property: The concur-
rency property applies to all audit records ei ∈ E recording
Fig. 2: Experimental Forensically-Aware Database Architecture.
DML operations generated in their corresponding tables
Ti ∈ NDB, which are not sequential with each other:
∀ea, eb ∈ E • (ea ‖ eb ⇒ ¬(ea hb−→ eb ∧ eb hb−→ ea))∧
(ea.τ [c], eb.τ [c] > 0) (19)
V. EXPERIMENTAL DEPLOYMENT
For audit records eji ∈ Fi to be used as digital evidence,
Chain-of-Custody (CoC) must be initiated and maintained
during their generation, collection and preservation within
a forensically-aware database architecture. In Fig.2, we imple-
ment an experimental architecture, based on the VC approach
proposed in [6], yet utilizing a HLC mechanism instead, similar
to the one implemented by [9]. As a result, a timeline Tι
of timestamps Vn can be built to keep an audit trail of the
occurrence of DML operations against NDB. The functional
components of the experimental architecture are described as
follows:
(A) Concurrent DML Operation Generator: JMeter config-
ured in Master-Slave mode.
(B) Transactional (NDB) and Forensic (FDB) Databases:
Deployed in MSSQL Server 2014 in Linked Server mode
and synchronised with an NTP-based time service.
(C) Proactive Database Forensics Controllers: SQL C# triggers
and stored procedures implemented as forensic controllers
in both NDB and FDB.
For better understanding, it is important to clarify the difference
between architectural components and functional controllers
in our research context. Whilst a component refers to an
architectural element in charge of performing specific actions,
a controller is a logical routine responsible for coordinating the
behaviour of such components during the generation, collection
and preservation of audit records. In the following subsections,
the architecture’s functional components, including the logic
functionality of its forensic controllers, are explained in detail.
A. Concurrent DML Operation Generator
For simulating real user transactions, synthetic workload
is generated by implementing a concurrent environment in
which a set of n insiders ∈ I (Def.IV.6) can perform a
number of DML operations against NDB using a specific
administrative role (DBadm or DBus) (Def.IV.5). Thus, for
stressing the architecture, a Master Event Generator (MeGen)
and three Client Event Generators (CeGen) are used, as shown
in Fig.2.[sec. (A)]. These generators are deployed using JMeter
in master-slave mode, enabling us to open threaded database
connections for sending concurrent DML operations to NDB.
B. Transactional and Forensic Databases
For preventing audit records to be tampered with due to
potential malicious insider actions, role segregation (Section
IV-A) is required so that audit and forensic activities can
be performed in a transparent, yet efficient way. Unlike the
centralised VC-based architecture in [6], ours achieve this
by distributing and physically segregating transactional and
forensic operations using two different database servers, each
hosting NDB and FDB with explicit operative (DBadm,DBus)
and forensic (DBfor) roles, respectively. For facilitating both
the collection of audit records in each audit table Fm, and the
construction of the timeline Tι, FDB (Fig.3) is de-normalised.
This ensures scalability in more complex environments where
centralised architectures may not perform well [9].
Fig. 3: A de-normalised forensic database structure.
C. Proactive Database Forensic Controllers
SQL CLR C# triggers and stored procedures are implemented
as forensic controllers, and deployed in both NDB and
FDB, beginning their execution when the Concurrent DML
Operation Generator component sends threaded operations
to NDB. These controllers, as depicted in Fig.2.[sec. (C)]
are implemented following the formal specifications given
in Section IV, allowing CoC to be initiated and maintained
since the generation and collection of audit records until
their preservation in the timeline Tι. As opposed to the VC
architecture in [6], the HLC mechanism in these controllers,
makes our architecture more scalable because the timestamp
size in Tι is independent of the number of audit tables.
Nonetheless, as previously shown in Fig.1b, due to transitivity,
there is a high possibility of having intermediate audit records
(Eq.18), observed in Tι at the same pt time. This concurrency
problem may lead to inconsistencies requiring controlled
access to Tι by serialising the generation, collection and
preservation of audit records [6]. Therefore, any intermediate
audit record requiring to be timelined must ‘wait’ until any
previously observed ones are recorded in Tι. Lastly, due
to HLC implementation requirements, these databases are
synchronised with an NTP-based time service every 15 min.,
and deployed as linked (or federated) database servers for
enabling connectivity between NDB and FDB, and for remotely
executing these controllers. In the following sections, the
generation, collection and preservation of audit records through
these controllers are explained in depth.
Algorithm 1 Evidence Generation Controller
1: vars:
2: Ts : UTCnow . DateTime in UTC format
3: op : O . DML operation
4: u : I . insider
5: o : ip loc . Originating IP address
6: ρki : P init 〈〉 . Provenance in Eq.9
7: δ : tuple 〈dold, dnew〉 init 〈〉 . Ti transition
8: actions:
9: while ∃ gen(k, Ti) do . Eq.11
10: if (I, T ′i ) then . Insert
11: δ := 〈⊥, dki 〉
12: o := I
13: end if
14: if (U, T ′i ) then . Update
15: δ := 〈dki , dki ′〉
16: o := U
17: else . Delete
18: δ := 〈dkki ,⊥〉
19: o := D
20: end if
21: ρki := 〈Ts, op, u, assgTo(u), o〉 . Def.IV.5 role
22: send(δ, ρki , colct(gen(k, Ti))) . call to colct
23: end while
1) Evidence Generation Controller: This controller is com-
prised of evidence generation triggers deployed in NDB to
be executed every time the Concurrent DML Operation
Generator sends an operation to NDB. As shown in Alg.1, this
controller captures and remotely sends to its corresponding
audit table, provenance information (Def. IV.8) about the DML
Operation that either created or affected an entry dki in a table
Ti (Def. IV.10).
2) Evidence Collection Controller: After the evidence
generation controller has been executed, evidence collection
stored procedures deployed in FDB are in charge of both
receiving provenance information about DML operations on
a table Ti, and storing audit records in its corresponding audit
table Fi. Besides the received provenance information, the
Algorithm 2 Evidence Collection Controller
1: vars:
2: τ : Z× Z× N init ⊥ . HLC timestamp
3: pt : Z init 0 . Physical clock time
4: l, l′ : Z init 0 . Max. physical time pt known so far.
5: c : N init 0 . Concurrency tracking flag.
6: j : Z init 1 . Audit record local order
7: eji : tuple 〈τ, δ, p〉 init 〈〉 . Eq.10
8: actions:
9: if recv(δ, 〈Ts, op, u, r, o〉, op,Fi) then
10: pt := toUNIXtime(Ts)
11: l′ := l
12: l := max(l′, pt)
13: if l = l′ then . if there are concurrent DML ops.
14: c := c+ 1
15: else
16: c := 0
17: end if
18: τ := 〈pt, l, c〉 . DML Operation HLC timestamp
19: Ts := toUTCtime(l + c) . DML operation UTC
Timestamp
20: ei[j] := 〈τ, δ, 〈Ts, op, u, r, o〉〉
21: F ′i := Fi _ [eji ]
22: j := size(Fi) + 1
23: end if
24: send(i, j, e.τ [l], e.τ [c], prsv(op,F ′i), T ι) . call to prsv
HLC mechanism implemented in Alg.2, enables this controller
to capture a timestamp τ when a table changes state from Ti
to T ′i . As a result, an accurate UTC timestamp Ts about the
occurrence of DML operations can also be stored in audit
records, using for its calculation the value of τ captured by
the controller.
3) Evidence Preservation Controller: This controller is
composed of evidence preservation triggers and a particular
stored procedure which also implements a HLC-based forensic
mechanism for building the timeline Tι. These triggers execute
the stored procedure every time the controller is notified of
DML operations being generated in a table Ti ∈ NDB, and
collected in its corresponding audit table Fi ∈ FDB. Therefore,
following Alg.3, the resulting timeline Tι can be used later as
an audit trail for explaining the causality of audit records, and
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(b) Latency in the Centralised VC-based DB forensics Architecture.
Fig. 4: Latency Results - Vector-Clocks (VC) vs. Hybrid-Logical-Clocks (HLC)
Algorithm 3 Evidence Preservation Controller
1: vars:
2: τn : Z× Z× N init ⊥ . HLC timestamp
3: Tns : Z init 0
4: pt : Z init 0 . Physical clock time
5: l, l′, lm : Z init 0 . Max. physical time pi known so far.
6: c, cm : N init 0 . Concurrency tracking flag.
7: n : Z init 1 . Timestamp counter
8: Vn : tuple 〈i, j, τn, Tns 〉 . Eq.14 - Audit record
timestamp in Tι
9: if recv(i, j, e.τ [l], e.τ [c], prsv(op,F ′i), T ι) then
10: pt := UNIXtimenow
11: l′ := l
12: lm := e.τ [l]
13: cm := e.τ [c]
14: l := max(l′, lm, pt)
15: if l = l′ = lm then
16: c := max(c, cm) + 1
17: else
18: if l = l′ then
19: c := c+ 1
20: else
21: if l = lm then
22: c := cm + 1
23: else




28: τn := 〈pt, l, c〉 . HLC timestamp
29: Tns := toUTCtime(l + c) . UTC timestamp
30: V[n] := 〈i, j, τn, Tns 〉 . Audit record timestamp in Tι
31: Tι′ := Tι _ [Vn]
32: n := size(Tι) + 1
33: end if
VI. EVALUATION
For evaluation purposes, three stress test scenarios were
considered:
• With audit & forensic controls: Evidence Generation
and Preservation Triggers are activated for generating,
collecting and preserving the occurrence of audit records.
• With audit controls only: Evidence Generation Triggers
enabled to generate and collect audit records.
• With no controls enabled: There is no audit or forensic
controllers activated.
During the test, 720 samples of DML operations (per test
scenario) were simulated using JMeter (Section V-A). The
generation, collection and preservation controllers (Section
V-C) were executed per each sample as serialized transactions
(2-phase locking execution) to avoid uncontrolled concurrent
observations.
TABLE I: Acceptable Latency Interval for Audit & Forensic
Controls
Latency Interval (sec.) No. of Samples %
Between 0.021 and 2.610 408 56.7
Between 2.610 and 3.0 54 7.5
Between 3.0 and 3.50 30 4.2
Between 3.50 and 9.545 228 31.7
Total 720 100.0
As shown in Fig.4, increased latency was expected in
our HLC-based architecture when compared with its VC
counterpart; mainly for two reasons (a) because it works in a
distributed environment with two different database servers for
transactional and forensic purposes each, and (b) due to inherent
limitations when using linked (federated) communication that
was mainly designed for data source merging between two
servers[23], and not for heavy transactional workload such as
the one implemented in the controllers. Nonetheless, assuming
an acceptable latency interval (up to 3.5 sec. per transaction),
in Table I, almost 70 per cent of samples showed latency
between 0.021 and 3.5 sec. when audit and forensic controls
were enabled. This proves that our HLC-based architecture is
TABLE II: Provenance and Causality of Audit Records in FDB
n i j pt l c lm cm op Insider u Role r Origin o Ts[n]UTC
161 2 31 1525135633234 1525135633234 0 1525135632969 0 I 1705997013 dbadmin 192.168.0.5 01:47:13.2341027 +01.00
162 2 32 1525135633234 1525135633234 1 1525135632969 0 I 1705997014 dbadmin 192.168.0.6 01:47:13.2341028 +01:00
163 6 16 1525135633234 1525135633234 1 1525135632986 0 I 1705997013 dbuser 192.168.0.5 01:47:13.2341029 +01:00
164 4 20 1525135633265 1525135633265 0 1525135633004 0 I 1705687116 dbuser 192.168.0.8 01:47:13.2653852 +01:00
165 2 33 1525135633294 1525135633294 0 1525135633003 0 I 1715987319 dbadmin 192.168.0.8 01:47:13.2944992 +01:00
Audit records ej2 ∈ F2 Audit records ej4 ∈ F4 Audit records ej6 ∈ F6
resilient enough to work under heavy transactional workload
in distributed settings.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Both VC and HLC-based proposals prevents audit record
modification by capturing provenance of DML operations
within a de-normalised segregated forensic database FDB.
Likewise, our architecture can also detect potential insider
misuse by querying audit tables Fi and the timeline Tι. For
instance timestamps V161 and V163 (Table II), warns of an
insider u interacting with NDB from the same originating
IP address, but using 2 different database roles. In contrast,
as opposed to its VC centralised counterpart, our distributed
HLC architecture has shown (i) higher accuracy when tracking
DML operations’ provenance and causality by timestamping
them with accurate physical time readings for better concurrent
event detection (Table II; V162, V163); (ii) more scalability in
terms of system size when more than one node 〈NDB,FDB〉
is involved in the computation since timestamps Vm are
independent of the number of audit tables; (iii) acceptable
performance under heavy transactional workload, considering
that 70 per cent of samples were processed with latency no
higher than 3.5 sec. when audit and forensic capabilities were
enabled. These results prove that HLC is very resilient to
technical limitations, such as implementing conservative 2PL
with linked servers. Future work will be developed towards
formally proving the correcteness of our proposal.
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